Abstract: Ireland's Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) for wind generation has some unusual features making it different from other REFIT schemes around the world. By utilising an annual floor price element the scheme presents an option value to the contract holder, which to date has gone unnoticed or unvalued in the market. By employing an option pricing framework, this paper has quantified for the first time in the public domain the expected costs and value of the Irish REFIT support scheme for wind generation. While the cost of the REFIT scheme to the electricity consumer appears to be lower than the cost of schemes in other countries, significant inefficiencies exist as a result of the structure of the scheme. The Irish REFIT scheme is contrasted with a single Fixed Price support scheme and the analysis suggests that the Fixed Price scheme can provide a similar or greater incentive to the wind sector at half the cost to the end electricity consumer, and may also prove more compatible with consumers desire to reduce inter-year electricity portfolio cost volatility.
Introduction
While much of the recent drive towards renewable energy and wind energy is as a result of issues that are integral to the international discourse on energy and climate policy, to date there has been very little direct policy action on an international scale in the area of renewable energy (Hirschl, 2009) . As a result there are numerous and varied approaches to wind energy policy around the globe. Each individual country adopts an approach which it deems to be appropriate to its local circumstances and ideological approach to market intervention (Saidur et al., 2010) . Investment and production tax incentives are used in many countries, but seldom in isolation from other market support schemes.
These market support schemes broadly fall into three categories. The two most significant categories are characterised by (Toke and Lauber, 2007) as the "neoliberal" market based approach, including renewable energy portfolio standards and tradable green certificates, and the more traditional "command and control" Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) type schemes like that operating in Germany. REFIT schemes typically involve a single or indexed fixed price for the purchase of energy from renewable projects. The third category, and now generally less favoured, is competitive tender schemes.
Proponents of the market based approach claim that this system fosters more intense competition resulting in a reduced cost of achieving renewable energy targets. On the other hand, advocates of the REFIT style system argue that it results in a less bureaucratic system with a lower risk profile for investors, while also fostering a greater degree of local ownership than the market based systems (Toke and Lauber, 2007) . Several reviews of the performance of each system of these supports in different markets suggest that the REFIT type schemes provide a more cost effective support regime (Elliott, 2005) , (Toke and Lauber, 2007) . One of the most high profile market based support schemes is the Renewable Obligation (RO) scheme in the UK. This scheme is currently under review by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government, with a view to replacing it with a Contract for Difference (CfD) based REFIT scheme (Pöyry, 2010a) .
Ireland had originally introduced a competitive tender scheme called the Alternative Energy Requirement (AER) which it was believed could achieve a low cost way of incentivising renewable energy, provided no strategic bidding took place in the auctions (Huber et al., 2007) . However, it appears that those early competitive tender schemes were relatively unsuccessful due speculative bids that were often too uneconomic to actually execute the project. Similar behaviour was seen in similarly unsuccessful schemes in the UK (Mitchell, 2000) . After the AER schemes, in 2006 Ireland adopted a REFIT type scheme for the promotion of renewable energy. Ireland's REFIT scheme has many attributes of a classic REFIT scheme but also has some unusual features including a floor price/option element and a direct payment to cover the "balancing costs" of renewable generation. This paper is focused on examining the Irish REFIT scheme and in particular the more unusual aspects of the scheme in order to foster a debate on its efficiency in the Irish market. To do this, a basic market forecast and option pricing model is implemented in order to achieve for the first time in the public domain an estimate of the total expected cost and value of the REFIT scheme for a wind project in
Ireland. This initially puts in context the costs of the REFIT scheme in Ireland against the costs of schemes elsewhere in the world. Further discussion and commentary on the use and appropriateness of the REFIT scheme in the Irish market follows.
Section 2 of this paper outlines the existing structure of the Irish REFIT scheme and includes some commentary on how the scheme has been viewed by wind industry to date. Section 3 sets out to quantify the cost and value of the REFIT scheme by taking a view of the electricity market and the value of wind in the market in the future. The option value of the REFIT scheme is then found by applying a basic option pricing model. Section 4 presents the results of the quantification and examines some of the implications. The discussion in section 5 further analyses the appropriateness of the REFIT scheme and presents some alterations to the scheme to increase its effectiveness. Other desirable aspects of schemes, like their suitability to the capital profile of the wind projects and their ability to decrease aggregate portfolio price volatility are also touched on in section 5, before conclusions in section 6.
Ireland's REFIT Scheme

Structure of the REFIT Scheme
The original REFIT Scheme in Ireland was initiated on 1st May 2006 with the aim of supporting 400 MW of renewable generation to fulfil a 1450 MW target by 2010 (DCENR, 2011) . Since then the scheme has been extended in terms of eligible capacity. The original REFIT scheme expired in 2010, however, in early 2011 work was underway to establish a follow-on scheme of a similar structure which would include offshore wind generation and other sources of generation. The work presented in this paper is based on the structure of the original REFIT scheme that was available for applications from 2006 to 2010. The cost of the REFIT support scheme is covered by a Public Service Obligation (PSO) which also supports other market interventions such as peat generation and the provision of peaking plant. These PSO costs are then levied on all customers. (CER, 2011a) The REFIT support scheme is a 15 year support scheme which is made available to supply companies with the assumption that the supply companies will then efficiently contract with REFIT qualified renewable generation projects through a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA).The REFIT scheme provides varying levels of support for 4 different types of renewable energy projects, namely On-shore Large Wind (projects >5MW); On-shore Small Wind (projects <5MW); Hydro and Biomass, and Landfill Gas.
The financial support provided by the REFIT scheme is comprised of in 3 distinct elements:
1.
Floor Price Element -The floor price element provides qualifying projects with an effective floor price on their annual energy market revenue. This floor price applies on an annual basis for each year of a 15 year term covered by the REFIT contract. If in any year the energy market revenue of the project is below that which would be yielded by the floor price the relevant supply company will be refunded the difference from the PSO mechanism. In years when the energy market revenue of the project is above that which would be yielded by the floor price, no payments are made and the relevant supply company keeps the total market the market and a reference for the energy market revenue of the REFIT projects. In the current SEM the reference price is the total per MWh revenue that would be received by the wind generation in the market. It will be referred to throughout this paper as the wind weighted market price. The floor price element is the only element of the REFIT scheme that is referenced to the market.
2.
Balancing Payment Element -The balancing payment element is an additional payment to the relevant supply company to cover notional costs of "balancing" the variable wind energy in the energy market. This element was designed during a time when the pre-SEM market arrangements included penalising imbalance prices called "top-up" and "spill". It is likely that this payment was based on the cost of achieving a base-loaded or customer profiled energy position in the market with a variable wind output profile and the prevailing imbalance prices at the time. With the onset of the SEM market, where there are no direct imbalance penalties associated with wind generation, the balancing payment element of the REFIT scheme looks rather ill-defined and dated. 
Experience of REFIT in the Market
Anecdotal evidence to date suggests that wind projects and other REFIT qualified projects are assessed based on the minimum level of support available through the REFIT scheme (Harte, 2010) . Industry sources openly suggest that €76.30 is the revenue available to a large wind project. However, the nature of the REFIT scheme is such that the floor price element, the most substantial element of the payment, is in fact a series of 15 annual energy market put options given at no cost by the consumers through the PSO to the REFIT qualified project. The scheme is analogous to a series of put options in so far as, if the project (or holder of the REFIT PPA) does not achieve an adequate price in the market each year for its output they are entitled to the financial equivalent of having the put option counterparty (i.e. the PSO mechanism) purchase their output at the agreed strike price (i.e. the REFIT floor price) (Figlewski et al., 1992) . These put options could be categorised as "European Options" since they can be thought of as only being exercisable after the expiration date of the option at the end of each year. The value of these options, i.e. elimination of the potential energy market downside and the retention of the potential market upside, appear to be substantially ignored by the industry so far, and the floor price element put options appear to only be valued at their strike price. This would suggest that utility supply companies are, for the most part, keeping the upside available through the REFIT scheme without passing the benefits on to renewable projects through increased contract prices or on to consumers through lower electricity tariffs. Industry evidence suggests that few, if any, PPAs with utility suppliers are set at prices above the minimum support level fixed in the REFIT contract. If there are arrangements on sharing energy market revenue upside, it is likely that this revenue is not taken into account when assessing the viability of the renewable energy projects or calculating Internal Rates of Return (IRR) versus hurdle rates.
This is a significant element of the REFIT support scheme that is going unnoticed or undervalued. This raises questions as to the efficiency and appropriateness of the structure of the REFIT support scheme. It may be the case that the optionality of this element of the support scheme is overly complicated for the wind developers themselves who with highly leveraged capital intense projects favour simple single value PPAs with suppliers. In this contractual structure, excess (above the floor price) energy market revenues would accrue at times of high market prices to the supply business which signed the REFIT PPA. With no evidence that many PPAs are signed above a level based on the floor price, which would reflect the possibility of this excess revenue in the future, we are left to surmise that the supply businesses are undervaluing this potential revenue. There may be two reasons for this. Firstly, this type of revenue may be too sporadic and uncertain to be compatible with suppliers' business models which are typically based on low margin, high volume operations with a 6-12 month planning horizon.
Secondly, the complexities in quantifying the option value may also create a barrier to valuing the REFIT contract. An alternative possibility is that the supply businesses are tacitly colluding in order to keep this revenue in their sector of the market. However, given that there are more than 5 supply companies operating in the PPA market at present, this possibility seems unlikely.
The option value of the REFIT support scheme is either poorly understood or undervalued by the renewable energy projects, or by the PPA suppliers, or by both. However, the electricity consumers are underwriting the cost of the REFIT scheme, including the option element, which thispaper argues is
clearly not effective at incentivising wind generation. The following sections will aim to analyse and quantify this phenomenon.
Quantifying the Value and Cost of the REFIT Scheme.
Quantifying the minimum guaranteed price available from the REFIT scheme is a simple task as already presented in Table 1 . However, quantifying the option value and cost of the floor price element of the REFIT scheme is much more challenging as it relates to the likely future revenue and possible spread of future revenues available to a wind project in the SEM.
There are two significant elements which must be dealt with in order to quantify the option value:
1. Forecasting the level and possible spread of the yearly average electricity market prices in
Ireland. This will be substantially driven by the variances in the international fuel and carbon markets as well as being influenced by the evolution of the Irish generation portfolio and annual capacity margins.
2. Forecasting the proportion of the average electricity market price that wind generation will extract in Ireland. It has been well established (Sensfuß et al, 2008) , (Munksgaard and Morthorst, 2008 ) that as wind capacity increases in a system the average price the wind generation will extract from the market will decrease due to the depression of prices in the hours when there are large volumes of incrementally "free" wind energy. The magnitude of this effect will depend on the evolution of the Irish generation portfolio, the level of wind capacity and the market structure.
Each of these topics represents large fields of research worthy of more detailed investigation in their own right. The intention of this paper, however, is not to pursue these issues in great depth, but rather to make some assumptions based on existing data and industry experience to present initial findings and foster a debate on the appropriateness of the REFIT support scheme in Ireland.
Level and spread in the expected yearly average electricity market prices in Ireland
This section aims to make some basic assumptions about the level and spread of possible yearly electricity prices in Ireland over the next 20 years. As experienced electricity price commentators and analysts know the "forecast is always wrong" (Schweppe et al., 2000) , but the act of compiling forecasts in essential. Several leading industry service providers like Poyry, IHS Global Insight and Wood
MacKenzie, provide various fuel and electricity market modelling and forecasting services. However, few if any will provide probabilities or distributions associated with their forecasted scenarios. These are required to value the option in a scheme such as REFIT. All forecasts, no matter how intensely modelled, are at their most fundamental level, simply an analyst's view of the market. This is what will be provided in this section, an analyst's view of the possible level and spread of outcomes in the market
Figure 1: Example of Historic Oil, Gas and Electricity Price Movements 2 (Pöyry, 2010b ), 2001 (CER, 2011b , (SEMO, 2011) , (Inflationdata, 2010) .
1 For clarity the forecast contained in this paper is derived for academic purposes and does not purport to represent a reliable basis for investment in the electricity sector. The authors give no warranty or assurances as to the accuracy of the forecasts or any other work in this paper. In order to assess the value and cost of the option offered by the REFIT floor price element, distributions of the likely annual average electricity market price is required for each of the next 20 years. As Figure 1 illustrates annual fuel and electricity price movements appear to be asymmetric. The potential upside volatility appears to vary further from the average than the downward variances, which tend to be more stable and sustained. In addition, there are several elements in the structure of the energy and electricity markets which point to this tendency towards asymmetry. Hugely price insensitive demand in the fuel and electricity markets are one obvious potential driver to upside volatility, while the structure of some of the fuel markets, where groups like OPEC have significant price setting ability will tend to limit the periods of significantly low price. In the electricity markets it is hard to imagine sustained prices achieving levels significantly lower than that required by a marginal thermal plant plus a cost based fuel price element. On the upside, it is hard to for an observer to identify a similar basis for a limiting upper threshold on price, given the possible impact of fuel price spikes and periods of tight system capacity margin.
Reviewing historic data, and based on this asymmetric view of possible future price movements, the 
P10 Price Series :
The 10 th percentile series of prices describe the level at which there is only a 10%
probability that the average market price in each year will outturn at a level lower than the relevant price in this series. This price is set here at 40 €/MWh in each year in real terms. Over the past 10 years only one year produced a price close to this level. In 2001 the regulated market price was set at 44.32 €/MWh.
P80 Price Series :
The 80 th percentile series of prices describes the level at which there is an 80%
probability that the average market price in each year will outturn at a level lower than the relevant 
Proportion of the average electricity market price that renewable energy will extract
There are many studies focused on the effect of wind energy on electricity market prices. (Sensfuß et al, 2008) , (Munksgaard and Morthorst, 2008) . What is clear is that wind generation will depress the general electricity market price and in so doing will disproportionately suppress the wind weighted price that it itself would receive in the market. This is a complex topic requiring the analysis of the portfolios mix, the level and capacity of renewable and interconnection in the system, as well as international fuel prices and any changes in the wholesale market structure itself. A detailed analysis of this topic is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.. Consequently, some basic assumptions around the issue are made.
Data was compiled (SEMO, 2011), (Eirgrid, 2011) found over all the scenarios tested that the value of wind in the market, were it not to effect the market prices, is 1.4% greater than the time weighted average market price in each year.
Further analysis was carried out to assess the actual effect wind generation had on its own price in the market. Table 2 highlights the actual average market and wind weighted market prices from the 3 years of available data. It can be seen that the wind weighted market price was on average 5.5% lower than the time weighted average price in the market. Adjusting for the level of installed wind generation would suggest that 1 GW of wind capacity will receive approximately 4% less than the time weighted market price. Assuming a +1.4% starting point outlined above and a -4% end point, it would appear that the first GW of installed wind capacity on the Irish system suppressed its own price by around 5.4% relative to the time weighted market price. In the absence of a detailed portfolio study and without knowledge of the future changes to the wholesale market rules a basic assumption is made that wind generation will suppress its own price at a rate of 4% per GW of installed wind capacity with respect to the time weighted average price in each year. Finally, this paper assumes that the installed wind capacity in the SEM will grow from around 1800 MW in 2010 to 5800MW in 2030 (SEI, 2009). Table 3 below shows the assumed installed wind capacity and the assumed wind weighted market price series for the P50, P10 and P80 cases for each year. Figure 3 below shows the projected future average and wind weighted market price scenarios. 
Distributions Fitting
In order to estimate the option value of the REFIT floor price element a distribution must be fitted to the range of forecasted possible outcomes for the wind weighted market price in each year. Given the low probability of zero values and the asymmetric view of the market price movements, a Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) distribution was chosen to describe the range of possible market outcomes in each year. While this type of distribution is usually used to model the statistics of extreme events and "tail risk" (Cole, 2001) , the flexibility of its 3 fitting parameters and the overall shape was deemed useful and reflective of this analyst's view of the market. The probability density function of the GEV distribution (pdfgev) is given below, where µ is the location parameter, σ is the scale parameter, and k is the shape parameter.
The GEV distribution was fitted to the corresponding P50, P10 and P80 prices for each year and presented above using the array of functions available in the Matlab Statistics Toolbox. The corresponding parameters for the fitted distribution in each year are given in Table 4 . All fitted distributions where found to have a positive shape parameter k which characterises the distributions as Type II, or Fréchet. Predictability all distributions' k values are less than 1 which is the criterion for a finite mean. Figure 4 shows the resulting probability density functions for each year. From these yearly distributions the expected mean value of the wind generation and the impact of the option in the floor price element can be assessed. Figure 4: Probability density function for wind weighted price in each year
Results
Using the distributions defined in the previous section and the array of functions available in the Matlab
Statistical Toolbox the results presented in Table 5 are derived. All results outlined in this section are in Real 2010 euro terms. Table 5 shows the mean expected value of wind generation in the market. This is simply the mean of the distributions in each year and has an average value over the range of years of 65.05 €/MWh.
Also shown in Table 5is Several observations stem from the analysis. Firstly, if a comparison is made between the total mean expected revenue per MWh to the wind farm and the mean expected worth of the wind generation in the market (87.92 versus 65.05), one can for the first time in the public domain estimate that the Irish electricity consumer will on average expect to subsidise wind generation to the tune of 22.87 €/MWh.
The appropriateness of this level of support is not the topic of this paper and depends on the perceived benefits of renewable generation for security of supply, local economic growth and environmental sustainability. What can be observed is that the current level of subsidy in Ireland appears to be below that of other European countries such as the UK and Germany, where the RO certificates and REFIT tariffs appear to subsidise wind energy to a greater extent (OFGEM, 2010), (Bundestag, 2004) . The reason for the lower level of subsidy provided in Ireland may be predominantly due to the attractive wind speeds at Irish wind farm sites and the higher average wholesale electricity market prices.
The second observation is that the access to the market upside provided by the put options, which this paper argues is going unnoticed or undervalued in the market, at 11.62 €/MWh, comprises a not insignificant portion of the total expected revenue available to a wind project. In percentage terms, this
equates to approximately 15%. If this additional revenue were to become understood and valued it may have a noticeable impact on project returns and consequently the level of renewable generation capacity the REFIT scheme is effective in incentivising. The following example is derived to emphasise this point.
Example Project: A project is assumed to be built in 2010 and has an operating life of 20 years running from 2011 to 2030 inclusive. The first 15 years are assumed to fall under the REFIT scheme of which 2 valuations scenarios are presented below. The capacity factor is 35% and the availability is 95% throughout the life of the project. The capital costs are 1.7M €/MW, and the annual O&M costs are 2%
of the capital costs in each year (Harte, 2010) . The results in Table 6 show that the increased project valuations that result from properly valuing the option value of the REFIT are significant and would result in increased levels of renewable energy being incentivised in the market. Sensitivity analysis is not undertaken in this paper. The distributions used here already reflect the assumed uncertainly that prevails in future electricity market prices. Clearly differing views on the level and, more importantly, the uncertainty in the market will alter the option valuations. It is evident that few analysts have undertaken this type of analysis in the Irish marketplace and few forecasting organisations have associated distributions or probabilities with their price forecast scenarios.
Therefore, it is difficult to establish objectively the range over which any sensitivity analysis of other analysts' market perceptions could be undertaken. It is worth noting that the REFIT floor price falls quite centrally with respect to the future market view taken here, as illustrated in Figure 5 . This would tend to suggest that the option valuation will not be overly sensitive to slightly modifications of the market forecasts used in this paper.
5.
Discussion
Alternative REFIT Scenarios
This section will examine in more detail the component parts of the REFIT scheme and their effectiveness in incentivising wind generation in Ireland. This will be done by examining the existing REFIT scheme relative to five alternative scenarios. Three of these schemes will be modifications of the existing REFIT scheme where the floor price element and balancing payment element are present. The final two schemes examined will be basic fixed price schemes, with a single guaranteed price paid to the project. The analysis is built on the metrics presented in Real 2010 terms in Table 7 below. 
Further consideration of Single Fixed Price schemes versus Existing REFIT scheme
The above analysis highlights the inefficiencies in the existing REFIT scheme and also outlines the benefits that a simpler Fixed Price Scheme would have. While this paper has substantially focused on the valuation of support schemes, there are other aspects that need to be considered when comparing the existing REFIT scheme to any possible alternatives. The follow three sections touch on other aspects of the schemes and highlight further the attractiveness of a Fixed Price scheme over the existing REFIT scheme.
Structure of Scheme:
The balancing payment element of the existing REFIT scheme, which was initially designed to financially compensate the contracted supplier for the balancing costs of the variable wind generation is now ill defined given that there are no direct costs of balancing wind in the wholesale market. This outdated element, the unusual upwards only inflation indexation and the generally fragmented nature of the REFIT scheme points towards an overly complicated and engineered support scheme. The alternative scheme presented here, i.e. a single Fixed Price feed-in tariff properly linked to inflation, appears to achieve greater efficiency with a simpler and more understandable structure. The upside which is sporadically available through the REFIT scheme is not easily quantified and is not transparent to the market. This increases the probability that utility supply companies will fail to pass on the benefits to either renewable projects or customers. A transparent Fixed Price scheme would not suffer from this effect.
Matching the Capital Profile of the Project:
One of the reasons that REFIT-type schemes appear to be gaining favour over market based schemes like the RO is that the simplicity of the guaranteed price matches the up-front capital intense profile of the wind projects. The market based schemes often result in assumed project revenue being discounted for the uncertainty inherent in the energy market and the uncertainty in the quasi-market that governs the tradable green certificates.
The Irish REFIT system gives total price certainty up to the sum of the floor price and the balancing payment. However, the additional revenue associated with the expected market upside, even if correctly understood and quantified, appears to be too uncertain and sporadic to be compatible with either the highly leveraged capacity intense wind farm investment, or the contracted supply businesses.
This may partly explain why so little consideration has been given to this element to date. A single Fixed
Price scheme on the other had would match perfectly the risk profile on the revenues to the capital intensity of the project without the need for discounting any portion of the revenues.
Matching the Desire to Reduce Portfolio Price Volatility of the Consumer: There are large bodies of research that suggest it is more beneficial for electricity systems to achieve their longer run cost of electricity in a way that minimises the volatility of the energy costs from year to year (Doherty et al., 2008) . This point may well be self evident but it is particularly pertinent for a small, open and competitive economy like Ireland's. A traditional argument on the inclusion of wind energy in national electricity portfolios is that it is an effective hedge for part of the portfolio against high fuel or electricity market prices. The literature points at the dampening effect wind has on the long term portfolios costs of electricity (Doherty et al., 2008) . However, the current REFIT scheme, i.e. allowing REFIT contracted supply businesses to keep the unvalued upside in the market, effectively means that the customer will not benefit from the dampening effect that wind generation can have in a portfolio. In effect, the current REFIT scheme hands over, at the worst possible times from a portfolio risk perspective (i.e.
during high price years), market upside revenue to the supply business which may go completely unvalued and may make no contribution to the incentivisation of wind generation.
Alternatively, the single Fixed Price scheme would match perfectly the consumers desire to provide incentives to wind generation and reduce it long-run portfolio price volatility. Just as REFIT payments are made to the wind generation from the Public Service Obligation (PSO) mechanism during times of low prices, revenues would flow to the consumers through the PSO from the wind generation at time of high prices. If a single Fixed Price scheme was to be adopted, consideration would have to be given to the market structure in executing such an instrument, but a CfD type instrument similar to that being discussed in the UK may be appropriate (Pöyry, 2010a) . If a renewable project where to receive variable and uncertain prices from a wholesale market structure, the CfD may prove a useful instrument in combination with the wholesale market prices in delivering the financial equivalent of a Fixed Price scheme.
Conclusions
This paper has quantified for the first time in the public domain the costs and expected value of the Irish REFIT support scheme for wind generation. While the cost of the REFIT scheme to the electricity consumer appears to be lower than the cost of wind energy support schemes in other countries, significant inefficiencies have been identified in the scheme. All the evidence suggests that the optionality inherent in the scheme is being undervalued in the market, possibly due to the incompatibility of the uncertain and sporadic cash flows with the wind farm and supplier business models. It would seem that the uncertain nature of this part of the support scheme has caused the market to heavily discount the revenues, effectively rendering this part of the support scheme a waste of money. The analysis has shown that a simple Fixed Price support scheme could incentivise a similar amount of wind generation capacity onto the system for approximately half the cost to the end consumer, or alternatively incentivise an increased volume of wind generation capacity onto the system for the same cost as the existing REFIT. Furthermore, the single Fixed Price scheme would provide a simpler more certain support scheme which, if implemented correctly, would lend itself to hedging consumers' inter-year electricity price volatility.
